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Abstract
In an age in which the “imperial presidency” seems to have reached its apex,
perhaps most alarmingly surrounding the use of military force, conventional
wisdom remains fixed that constitutional and international law play a negligible
role in constraining executive branch decision-making in this realm. Yet as this
Article explains, the factual case that supports the conventional view, based largely
on highly selected incidents of presidential behavior, is meaningless in any standard
empirical sense. Indeed, the canonical listing of presidential decisions to use force
without prior authorization feeds a compliance-centered focus on the study of legal
constraint rooted in long-since abandoned understandings of how and why legal
systems function. While the reality that law does not operate as an on/off switch
has long been accepted among legal scholars when it comes to ordinary law—all
legal rules face “the fact of violation,” uncertainty in meaning, and a complex array
of human motives and incentives for acting—these phenomena seem yet to have
informed our understanding of law’s role in shaping decision-making surrounding
state uses of force. This Article argues that accounting for these features of law is
especially relevant to the study of constitutional and international regulations of
state use of force. Applying a more contemporary understanding of how law works,
the Article illustrates how shifting our methodological approach away from
compliance-centered metrics of legal constraint may require reinterpreting the
conventional set of examples we have long assumed we understood. At a minimum,
it requires redesigning our approach to the empirical study of executive branch
decision-making. And it suggests we may need to rethink what mechanisms may
most effectively constrain the “imperial presidency” in the years ahead.
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Introduction
From the President’s bombing of Syrian chemical weapons sites without
congressional authorization, to threats of “fire and fury . . . the likes of which the
world has never seen” in response to North Korean nuclear posturing,1 the current
presidency bears all the hallmarks of the “imperialism” that post-World War II
scholars have long described.2 Indeed, conventional wisdom, and many
contemporary scholars lamenting the acute failure of Madisonian democracy,3
would suggest that law matters little in executive branch decisions about the use of
military force. The scope of the President’s power to use force under Article II of
the Constitution is notoriously contested, as is the question which interpretive
methodology (text, history, practice, or otherwise) is best applied to settle that
meaning.4 Courts regularly rely on a range of justiciability doctrines to avoid ruling
on the constitutionality of any particular use of force.5 Congress’ occasional
attempts to reassert its own authority over the use of military force—through
framework statutes like the War Powers Resolution or targeted statutes authorizing
the use of force for only limited purposes—have encountered executive branch
interpretations rendering statutory constraints only marginally effective.6 Most
central of all in the conventional case that ours is an “imperial presidency” is a
ready set of examples in which presidents have used military force without
congressional authorization.7 Whatever constitutional rules regarding the

Peter Baker & Choe Sang-Hun, Trump Threatens “Fire and Fury” Against North Korea if It
Endangers U.S.
Video, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-koreaun-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html [https://perma.cc/4ZLS-QFDK]; see also Helene
Cooper & Ben Hubbard, Pentagon Says Syria Strikes Hit “Heart” of Chemical Weapons Program,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/middleeast/syriaairstrikes-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/6RHQ-4TZC].
2
See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); see also, e.g., Michael
D. Shear & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Trump Sending 5,200 Troops to the Border in an ElectionSeason
Response
to
Migrants,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
29,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/us/politics/border-security-troops-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/N9TT-LNFH]; U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Authority to
Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 115th Cong. 439, p. 2 (2017) (Statement of Senator Cardin)
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/authority-to-order-the-use-of-nuclear-weapons-111417
[https://perma.cc/2ZQA-9E2E].
3
See generally CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Graber, Levinson & Tushnet, eds.,
2018); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); ERIC A.
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC
(2010).
4
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
5
See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297–304 (D.D.C. 2016).
6
See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 84–89.
7
See generally LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995) (cataloguing examples);
SCHLESINGER, supra note 2.
1
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President’s use of force exist, they seem to have had little effect.8 (As detailed
further below, a substantially analogous case is often made for the functioning of
international—U.N. Charter-based—legal constraints on American use of force
abroad.)9 Accordingly, the conventional story suggests, those worried about
prospects for better limiting presidential power in this realm must look not simply
to changes in particular rules or personalities, but to more profound changes in
structural design.10
Yet even as the modern presidency appears to be reaching its imperial apex,
the conventional account of the presidency as largely unbound by law in this realm
has faced intriguing challenges from a growing set of empirical studies. Drawing
variously on quantitative and qualitative methods, political scientists and legal
historians have recently begun offering somewhat revisionist assessments of
Congress’ role in U.S. war making. For instance, some studies have found that
Congress has significantly influenced presidential behavior both in initiating the
use of force abroad and in shaping the conduct of ongoing wars.11 Other scholars
have shown that the courts’ behavior in war-related cases is not so categorically
different from their behavior in other cases,12 and have provided qualitative
illustrations of how judicial engagement on questions of domestic and international
law can influence executive branch decision-making well before a court renders a
final judgment on the merits.13 Executive branch observers have likewise leveraged
contemporary examples and experiential counter-narratives to demonstrate how
8

See Louis Fisher, A Dose of Law and Realism for Presidential Studies, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
672, 673 (2002) (“On matters of war, we have what the framers thought they had put behind them:
a monarchy. Checks and balances? Try to find them.”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 117-18 (1990);
SCHLESINGER, supra note 2.
9
See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 197–203
(2005).
10
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 4–7.
11
See generally DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS (2016) (charting the history of congressional regulation of warfighting);
DOUGLAS L. KRINER, AFTER THE RUBICON: CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING
WAR (2010) (examining the effect of legislative mechanisms for influencing the conduct of war);
WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS
ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (2007) (evaluating empirically whether and to what extent
congressional views influence presidential decisions to use force).
12
See, e.g., Gordon Silverstein & John Hanley, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion in Times of
War and Crisis, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1453, 1465–97 (2010) (canvassing empirical research suggesting
that the Supreme Court does not rule differently on war-related cases that reach the court during
wartime compared to those before the Court after the relevant war has ended); Lee Epstein et al.,
The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-war Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–
6 (2005) (finding that the existence of war has no effect on the outcome cases related directly to the
war); see also Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 793–807 (2011).
13
See, e.g., Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decision-making,
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 378–90 (2013); Ashley Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security
Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 841–53
(2013).
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executive agencies and offices, the media, and civil society have all functioned on
important occasions to forestall or reset an otherwise preferred course of executive
action toward one or another domestic or international law rule.14 These accounts
suggest that existing structural constraints have, in at least some circumstances,
served to change executive branch behavior.
Why, then, does the largely unreconstructed view persist that “the ‘imperial
presidency’ still seems to be alive and well”?15 This Article suggests it is because
of the apparent persuasiveness of the empirical claim at the heart of the
conventional case for the imperial presidency: presidents using military force “have
regularly breached constitutional principles.”16 Whether part of a broad narrative
of the expansion of presidential power in U.S. history generally, 17 or an empirical
listing of all those instances in which presidents have used force without prior
authorization,18 the picture is one of a presidency pulled “into a continuing pattern
of evasion” of legal constraint.19 While scholars have varied views on the
implications of this historical practice for the interpretation of constitutional and
international law,20 the basic contours of this empirical account are clear: consistent
non-compliance makes it apparent that law matters little in decisions to use force.21
As influential as this account has been in shaping contemporary
understandings of presidential power, this Article aims to make clear why such
singular catalogs of presidential behavior are meaningless in any standard empirical
sense. It also suggests that canonical invocation of such lists feeds a compliancecentered focus on the study of law’s influence on decision-making rooted in a long
abandoned jurisprudential understanding of how and why legal systems functions.
Indeed, it is far from apparent how one might divine law’s role in decision-making
from a study of behavioral outcomes without more. Asking whether an actor
complied with “x” rule tends to assume “x” is a fixed or singular value, when it is
often not clear, or open to reasonable dispute, what “x” requires.22 Even where “x”
14

See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11 ix–xvi (2012); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1707–
31 (2011); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation,
Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1256 (2006).
15
See, e.g., Kevin M. Kruse & Julian E. Zelizer, Have We Had Enough of the Imperial Presidency
Yet?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/opinion/president-trumpborder-wall-weak.html [https://perma.cc/JJ48-3RLK].
16
FISHER, supra note 7, at xi.
17
See generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 2.
18
See, e.g., KOH, supra note 8, at 67–100; Fisher, supra note 8, at 672–73.
19
KOH, supra note 8, at 122.
20
See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 4, at 424–29.
21
See Fisher, supra note 8, at 673 (“On matters of war, we have what the framers thought they had
put behind them: a monarchy. Checks and balances? Try to find them.”); KOH, supra note 8, at 117–
149 SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at viii–ix. On the international law side, see, e.g., GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 9, at 200–03.
22
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–08
(1958) (“A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an
automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? . . . .
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is certain, it may not be possible to isolate any singular factor as a but-for cause of
individual decision-making, when such complex decisions more likely turn on
multiple, often causally intertwined considerations negotiated among a group of
(themselves individually conflicted) decision makers.23 Moreover, no law,
domestic or international, enjoys uniform compliance (with or without formal
institutional enforcement).24 Knowing solely how often a particular actor complies
with a rule gives us no insight into whether such a compliance rate is high or low,
good or bad; only some independent normative standard for evaluating how much
compliance is to be expected can do that. Yet compliance studies rarely offer any
guide for how to make such a normative evaluation. And then there is the problem
of extraordinary circumstances, moments in which even highly developed rule-oflaw systems may celebrate legal non-compliance—from practices of civil
disobedience in a domestic law setting, to the creation of changed customary law
internationally. Such instances may be less indicative of the irrelevance of legal
constraints, as they are of a rational balancing of the anticipated consequences of
different actions, including the knowing violation of law.
While such phenomena have been well recognized features of law since
H.L.A. Hart’s Concept of Law,25 they seem to have little influenced the otherwise
blossoming empirical study of executive branch war-making decisions.26 However,
the implications of Hartian jurisprudence for the empirical study of law’s role are
significant. For where the limit of “law” is sanction-backed command,27 it may be
entirely reasonable to gauge the existence of legal “constraint” by the
demonstration of uniform (or near-uniform) compliance with the command. But in
the Hartian universe, where the measure of law is the sense of an obligation, and
the maturity of a legal system is found in its capacity (for example) to achieve
interpretive settlement, behavioral outcome in any given case speaks
indeterminately (or worse, circularly) to the presence of either of those features. In
this world, more meaningful understanding of law’s role may be found less in the
examination of singular outcomes (compliant or otherwise), than in, for example,
evidence that officials possess a strong, shared sense of a particular obligation, or
evidence that decision makers engage in commonly recognized secondary
processes in reaching a decision. Such evidence matters not because—as one strand
[T]here must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases
in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out . . . .”).
23
For a particularly rich account of decision-making process, see generally ABRAM CHAYES, THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE RULE OF LAW (1974).
24
See Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445, 452
n.16 (2006) (noting enforcement rates of domestic murder laws).
25
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAWS 92–93 (1961).
26
A sample of this work by U.S. foreign relations law scholars and political scientists is cited infra,
Part I. For a summary of the growing empirical literature on the international law side, see, e.g.,
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the
Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 91 (2012); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance
and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010) (summarizing compliance literature).
27
JOHN AUSTIN, 1 THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 123 (2nd ed. 1863).

375
2019 / Getting Past the Imperial Presidency
of compliance theory has long and rightly argued—the existence of such beliefs
and processes can help explain why officials comply.28 It matters because evidence
of such beliefs and acceptance of such processes themselves demonstrate that legal
constraint exists.
Our persistent (and, as I argue, misguided) assumptions about the
significance of presidential non-compliance in this realm are of no small import.
Given judicial attention to official practice as evidence of legal meaning,29 a
mischaracterization or misapprehension of the nature or continuity of that practice
can skew judicial and non-judicial understandings of both constitutional and
international law. Perhaps of greater importance, popular perceptions about the
scope of presidential power have the potential to influence the views not only of
average voters, but also official decision makers engaged in evaluating the legality
of presidential action.30 Particularly if instincts about presidential power inform
official judgment about the availability of force as an option, the belief that the
President has the power, whether or not the empirical record supports this belief,
may make the exercise of that power a self-fulfilling prophesy. If the historic
perception is “presidents always do this,” it would be unsurprising to find the
default expectation among officials is that “presidents can do this.”
In all events, understanding more accurately whether and when the
executive branch engages law in this realm has critical implications for reformers
interested in tightening constraints on power. If the conventional case is right, and
presidential behavior is most importantly explained by entrenched congressional
and judicial passivity, then significant structural adjustments may be required. If,
on the other hand, presidential behavior is at least partly explained by, for example,
officials’ failure to internalize particular primary obligations or secondary
processes, a wider set of channels to useful reform might be open.
This Article thus aims to make three distinct contributions to the literature
on law’s role in influencing executive branch decision-making about the use of
force. First, it offers a sustained methodological critique of the conventional
reliance on presidential-use-of-force outcomes to demonstrate the ineffectiveness
or irrelevance of law in decision-making. Second, it shows how Hartian
jurisprudence suggests alternative criteria for assessing law’s operation, and how,
contrary to scholarly concerns (including Hart’s own) about his utility in certain
28

See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2646–
58 (1997).
29
In constitutional law, the Supreme Court has opined that “a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be
treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.” Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). State practice is at least equally central to the development of
customary international law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Customary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”).
30
See Scott R. Anderson & Megan Reiss, Law and Public Intuition on the Use of Force, Part 1: An
Introduction, LAWFARE (May 4, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-and-public-intuitionuse-force-part-1-introduction [https://perma.cc/4UVM-N6AZ].
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public law settings, Hart’s model is especially useful in the study of constitutional
and international law regulating state use of force. Finally, it charts an alternative
approach to empirical research in this realm, one that moves away from
compliance-centered metrics, and toward metrics more capable of capturing the
role of law in the bureaucratic, sociological reality of executive branch decisionmaking. Applying this model, the Article illustrates how shifting our
methodological approach may require reinterpreting the conventional set of
examples we have long assumed we understood. In this respect, it also opens a
pathway for rethinking what may be the most useful mechanisms for constraining
the “imperial presidency” in the years ahead.
A final note before proceeding. Consistent with the practice shared by a
handful of the qualitative studies noted here (perhaps best described as falling in
the realm of U.S. foreign relations law),31 this Article considers these topics in the
context of both constitutional and international law. This dual focus in part reflects
the extent to which these bodies of law share multiple features in common: in
substantive content and, as noted further below, in mechanisms for resolving
common problems of legal indeterminacy and law violation.32 Most relevant to the
issue of empirical design, it is not uncommon (at least within the U.S. executive
branch) that decisions about constitutional and international legality of a particular
use of force are addressed as part of the same executive branch legal analysis,33 and
may be discussed and evaluated by the same group of decision makers in the same
room at the same time.34 While that phenomenon may pose challenges for certain
empirical studies, it also holds out the practical possibility of demonstrating one
way or another how different parts of these bodies of law really are.
I. Taking Empirical Ignorance Seriously
As influential as the conventional listing of unilateral presidential uses of
force has been in shaping contemporary understandings of the President’s regular
non-compliance with law, it can hardly be considered dispositive of the question
whether law effectively operates in this realm in any standard empirical sense. For
one, the conventional account of the imperial presidency tends to assume as its legal
baseline a constitutional rule requiring congressional authorization for the

31

See e.g., Ingber, supra note 13; Deeks, supra note 13.
For a useful discussion of this idea, see generally Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the
Domestic-International Divide: Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 155
(2004).
33
See, e.g., Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya
(Apr. 1, 2011), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf [https://perma.cc/854G-6GF2]
[hereinafter Krass OLC Memorandum] (regarding the President’s constitutional authority to use
force in Libya without congressional authorization).
34
See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS 63–67 (2015) (discussing the role of the interagency
national security lawyers group in use of force decision-making in the Obama Administration).
32
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executive to use force in all instances.35 Of course, not even the original
constitutional scheme was so straightforward. There is no dispute, for instance, that
even the Constitution’s framers thought the “executive power” set forth in Article
II contained, at a minimum, sufficient authority for the President to use force in
self-defense without waiting for Congress to act,36 a view the Supreme Court itself
embraced within the country’s first century of existence.37 The constitutional
baseline against which compliance is regularly measured could use at least this
much—and likely more—refinement.
Indeed, notwithstanding the well understood indeterminacy in baseline
constitutional and international rules,38 empiricists studying various state uses of
force have deployed a remarkable array of approaches to ignore it. Legal scholars,
who have tended to favor more qualitative approaches to evaluating questions of
executive branch compliance and constraint have tended to skirt the problem of
identifying a baseline rule by careful selection of examples, a habit most
problematic when cherry-picking instances of behavior that tend to accord with
theoretical expectations.39 Thus, for example, it is equally possible to find accounts
describing the post-9/11 period as one of government non-compliance with law and
failed legal constraints,40 as it is to find assessments of the same period identifying
rich examples of legal constraint in action over time.41 Many political scientists
assessing compliance tend to favor large data sets that surely avoid the cherry-

35

See, e.g., HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 11, at 1–6 & 264–65 n.13 (assuming as its legal
baseline an original constitutional rule requiring congressional authorization for the executive to
use force in all instances).
36
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 VOL. 2, at 318 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
37
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668–70 (1863).
38
See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 10–13 (1995); Bradley & Morrison, supra note
4, at 1115–16 (noting substantive disputes over the content of constitutional law regulating
presidential use of force).
39
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic, by Eric A.
Posner and Adrian Vermeule, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1410 (2012) (reviewing and critiquing
Posner and Vermeule on these grounds); Oona Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and
Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1423–25 (2006) (critique of Goldsmith
and Posner); GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 104–06 (critique of Koh).
40
See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 48–49 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 95–108 (2010) (inadequate constraints on executive branch
behavior in violation of Geneva Conventions); Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A
Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45, 56 (2009)
(noting the U.S. implementation of detention and interrogation policies, as well as the 2003 Iraq
invasion—all broadly thought inconsistent with international law).
41
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 51–201 (describing multiple, highly effective constraints
on executive); Morrison, supra note 14, at 1707–31 (challenging Ackerman’s account of a lawless
Executive and defending the role of OLC as a check on the President including as to the Geneva
Conventions).
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picking problem, but too much of this research is at the expense of identifying any
particular rule against which to measure compliance at all.42
Even assuming we could identify within some degree of error a set of
instances in which presidents have not complied with an identified (and more
interpretively compelling) legal rule, it is far from apparent what we should
conclude from the mere listing of non-compliant behavior about how much of a
problem non-compliance really is. Without knowing, for example, how many
instances there are in which presidents have complied with a constitutional rule
restricting the unilateral use of force, we can say nothing about compliance rate—
a figure requiring both a numerator and a denominator to assess. The list of
instances of presidential uses of force without congressional authorization is
nothing more than a selection on the dependent variable, as if one were to stand on
a New York City street corner and count instances of jaywalking as one’s sole
metric of law’s ability to constrain the behavior of New Yorkers. Any actual
assessment of compliance requires a catalog of those instances in which the
presidents used force without seeking congressional authorization, and those
instances in which presidents used force with congressional authorization. It also
requires listing those instances in which presidents contemplated but decided
against the use of force at all. Given the challenge of assembling such a list, it is
perhaps no surprise empiricists have largely avoided undertaking it.43
Moreover, even if an enterprising scholar produced a more meaningful
catalog of examples to assess, we would need yet some additional independent basis
to evaluate the significance of the information such a compliance rate provides.
Does the U.S. President’s compliance rate with use of force rules compare more or
less favorably to presidential compliance rates with other legal rules? Does it
compare more or less favorably to other law enforcement officials’ compliance
rates with other use of force rules? What comparative metric is most meaningful
here, and why? While some quantitative international law scholars have indeed
labored to develop data sets that might allow them to examine compliance rates (at
least, for instance, in the context of treaty-based military pacts),44 analysts are left

42

See, e.g., HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 11, at 9–10 ; James D. Morrow, When Do States
Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 559, 559–72 (2007) (testing compliance against
“issue areas” rather than actual rules, noting that “the data are not based on a precise legal analysis
of whether particular acts constitute violations of the treaty in question.”).
43
On this point, the study by Howell and Pevehouse examining congressional influence on
presidential decisions to use force (through legislative enactments and public appeals) deserves great
credit. Howell and Pevehouse scour New York Times reports to generate a dataset of more than
15,000 non-uses of force during this period: “foreign events that stood a nontrivial chance of
provoking a U.S. military intervention.” HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 11, at 78–80. By
design, however, the study is one of congressional, not legal, influence.
44
Drawing on a sample of bilateral treaties formed between 1816 and 1989, Leeds and Savun
examined rates of treaty compliance and circumstances of termination, aiming in their terms to shed
light on “whether international law constrains leaders.” Brent Ashley Leeds & Burcu Savun,
Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?, 69 J. POL. 1118, 1118–32 (2007)

379
2019 / Getting Past the Imperial Presidency
to “suppose” they might demonstrate “a fairly good rate of nonabrogration” without
the benefit of any way of assessing in this context what counts as good or bad.45
Above all, even if it were possible to identify (or at least defensibly select)
a set of instances in which the President both did and did not comply with a
particular constitutional or international law rule regarding the use of force, it is yet
another matter to identify in each of those instances whether law qua law was the
reason why the President acted (or declined to act) as he did. For a general
correlation between the existence of a legal rule and executive action is, after all,
no demonstration of a causal connection between the two. Here, complications
abound.
First, there is the question of whether empiricists asking if “law matters” are
interested in studying the effect on decision-making of the behavior of law-related
structures or institutions (like a court), or the effect of the existence of a legal rule
(a discrete, normative obligation, with or without enforcement mechanism
attached) standing alone. International law empirics have especially struggled with
untangling its objects in this respect, often using the term “international
institutions” to describe both rules contained in treaties (like the rule prohibiting
targeting civilians in armed conflict) and institutions or organizations that policed
compliance with those rules.46 More recent international law scholarship in this
realm has fared better, and indeed, one of the most fruitful lines of empirical inquiry
has focused on the ways in which different structural mechanisms or incentives—
from courts and other institutional actors and organizations,47 to domestic politics

(finding that most treaty-based alliances during this period were honored most of the time, with
approximately one-third of such agreements ending in violation by one side or another).
45
Simmons, supra note 266, at 281 (“[G]iven the importance of alliances to vital national security
interests, one might suppose this figure represents a fairly good rate of nonabrogration [sic]”).
46
See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 266, at 48 (“[O]ften political science scholarship has not
clearly distinguished the roles of customary international law, formal legal agreements such as
treaties, and organizations such as tribunals. Instead, these phenomena are treated as a loosely
defined amalgam of ‘legal institutions.’”). The extent to which that semantic habit pervaded the
literature remained visible as political scientists developed empirical studies of international legal
constraint. See, e.g., Morrow, supra note 42, at 560 (“Realists give pride of place to calculations of
power and interest and believe that such calculations are rarely affected by international institutions,
such as international law.”).
47
See generally Scharf, supra note 40 (reporting findings from meetings with former State
Department Legal Advisers); Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical
Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (reporting findings from
interviews with JAG lawyers); see also KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF
EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 182–209 (2001)
(attributing domestic government compliance with ECJ rulings to concerns about political
legitimacy).
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and sociology48—influence state decision-making.49 The study of structural,
institutional constraints has been equally rich among legal scholars in recent years.
While still shying away from core constitutional questions about the President’s
power to use military force,50 scholars have drawn on a combination of personal
government experience, interviews, and an otherwise rich historical record to
examine how various mechanisms (both internal forces such as those inside the
executive branch or other branches of government, and external forces like the
media and NGOs) shape state behavior.51
Yet while such analyses certainly shed greater light on why states act as
they do, it is often difficult to untangle whether they are observing the effect of
“law” as such—that is, the existence of a formal legal rule against, say, torture—or
are instead measuring the effect of intervening organizational, political, or
sociological dynamics that could or would find expression in state behavior even
in the absence of a particular binding legal rule.52 Studies apparently aimed at

48

See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 125–154 (2009) (examining the role of domestic political constituencies in
promoting compliance with international human rights law); RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS,
SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–16 (2013)
(positing a sociology of state influence on other states).
49
Beth Simmons’s study of state behavior in the face of international human rights treaties, for
example, demonstrates several ways in which participation in such treaties can ultimately influence
state behavior: by putting issues on the domestic legislative agenda that would not have arisen as a
result of national processes alone; by providing authoritative legal support in domestic litigation or
by supporting domestic implementing legislation that itself is useful in domestic litigation; and by
encouraging local groups to mobilize politically to demand action on human rights issues
domestically. SIMMONS, supra note 48, at 125–54.
50
Indeed, to the extent constitutional resort-to-force questions are addressed, it is largely to embrace
the conventional account of executive war power as an exception to the otherwise-legallyconstrained rule. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 182 (“[A]s President Obama’s 2011 military
intervention in Libya without congressional approval makes plain, legal checks on unilateral uses
of military force are weak at best, especially with regard to low-level uses of force that do not
involve ground troops.”). It is perhaps ironic that Goldsmith separately assesses Obama’s
intervention in Libya to be in accordance with constitutional law. See Jack Goldsmith, War Power:
The Campaign Against Libya Is Constitutional, SLATE (March 21, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/03/war_power.html
[https://perma.cc/SBJ2-M3BD].
51
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 144, at 51–201; Ingber, supra note 133, at 360–66; Deeks, supra
note 133, at 829–33 (assembling a set of recent examples in which the executive has changed or
amended national security policies, changes motivated by the prospect (without more) that judicial
engagement might call the policy’s legality into question); Trevor Morrison, Stare Decisis in the
Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1470–92 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare
Decisis] (examining written, publicly available OLC opinions issued between the beginning of the
Carter Administration and the end of the first year of the Obama Administration, and finding close
to a quarter of the opinions rejected or limited a discernable White House position); Pearlstein, supra
note 12, at 1256.
52
Compare, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 51–201 (describing the role of the media, NGOs, military
lawyers and others in influencing executive policy decisions), with, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra
note 9, at 8–9 (suggesting such accounts may not observe the effect of law as such, but rather
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shedding light on the impact of a legal rule as such on behavior53 have rightly been
criticized for failing to account for selection effects, i.e., the possibility that states
only ratify those treaties whose terms they would honor even in the absence of a
treaty.54 Many equally struggle to defend claims that a correlation between legal
rule and subsequent behavior actually shows that the legal rule alone is why the
behavior unfolded as it did. For instance, Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro’s
recent study examined 254 cases of territorial exchange between states that took
place during a militarized conflict involving conquest from 1816 to 2014,55 and
concluded that interstate wars resulting in enduring territorial conquest became
dramatically less significant after the adoption of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact
(purporting to outlaw wars of aggression).56 Yet this study did not attempt to
explain whether the adoption of the pact itself, or rather other contemporary
phenomena, like the advent of nuclear weapons may have had a greater or even
dispositive causal effect on decision-making.57 Such compliance studies offer
insight into what happened after 1928, but often speak far less persuasively about
why.
Indeed, even if one could correct for such problems of data and survey
design, there is more than one reason to imagine that fully disentangling the relative
importance of law from other decision-maker concerns in this sense—whether law
or politics, normative commitment or self-interest—is simply not susceptible to
empirical discovery through behavioral outcomes.58 What empirical insights we
have into the reality of decision-making within the executive branch regarding the
use of force show consistently that state-organizational decision-making involves
groups of actors, each of whom has multiple motives and interests, debated among

organizational or sociological effects, economic or other interests that would find expression in state
behavior even in the absence of binding law).
53
See, e.g., OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT I. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL
PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 312–13 (2017) (examining the issue in the context
of international law).
54
See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 26, at 280–93 (describing studies and selection effects critique);
Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 266, at 91 (“What looks like effectiveness or compliance might be
caused by something else. The job of the analyst who is measuring the effect of an agreement is to
separate its impact from the noise of those many other forces.”); cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor
W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1097, 1112–24 (2013) [hereinafter Bradley & Morrison, Presidential Power] (analyzing formal
and informal legal constraints on the presidency).
55
HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 312–13.
56
HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 313–35 (either because most territory taken in war after
1928 was later returned to its pre-1928 owners, or if not, was far smaller in area than the vast land
conquests of the old world order in which aggressive war was unquestionably lawful).
57
HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 331–33.
58
See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 825–36
(2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3). The suggestion that legal constraint can
only be demonstrated by establishing the possibility that law may be a but-for cause of decisionmaking thus seems especially problematic. See Bradley & Morrison, Presidential Power, supra note
54, at 1122. More, as the following Part suggests, Hartian jurisprudence does not require it.
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themselves and even within the individual.59 As sociologists have long suggested,
it may be inaccurate, or even impossible, to identify any singular factor as a but-for
cause of an individual’s decision to act or not, when people regularly act for
multiple, often causally intertwined reasons—reasons that may well vary by
individual, or even within the same individual whose circumstances or focus
changes with the time of day.60 More, even if it were possible to identify particular,
situational examples of decisions in which law played relatively more or less
significant a role than other considerations, it is at best problematic to assume that
such individual incidents are either characteristic or exhaustive of the role law plays
in decision making day to day. If we are to leave empirical room for the possibility
that law “matters” in ways more than just in determining an individual decisional
outcome – that law, for example, shapes the language, categories, expectations and
habits within which the use of force is contemplated, debated, and assessed – then
the study of law’s role must be based on something more than outcome-based
assessment alone.61
For the overlapping fields of scholars occupied with resolving whether law
can constrain executive branch behavior, the sustained focus on compliance makes
strong intuitive sense. What good is a constitutional division of powers related to
war—or indeed any legal rule regulating official use of force—if its existence has
no independent effect on actually changing official behavior on questions of force?
Yet, the moment one undertakes to measure a particular rule’s impact empirically,
it becomes apparent how contingent compliance is: which contested definition of a
rule and what surrounding circumstances necessitate compliance? In a world where
ordinary laws are violated with some regularity, how many individuals must change
their behavior in order to conclude law “constrains” it? What counts as an
“independent” effect of law, rather than some other, isolatable reason for behavior?
To make sense of any results, and further to understand how we might reasonably
expect constitutional or international law in this realm to function, we need a
baseline definition and theory of law.
II. Why Hart Matters to High Power
The theoretical framework that supports contemporary empirical inquiries
into the role of law in constraining power was forged at a time when prevailing
jurisprudential theory offered very different answers to the question “what law is
and how it works” than those embraced by scholars today. At the birth of the current
legal order governing U.S. use of force abroad—marked by, among other things,
the post-World War II ratification of the UN Charter prohibiting aggressive war,
and President Truman’s congressionally unauthorized war in Korea—international
59

See, e.g., CHAYES, supra note 23, at 28–40.
See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
61
For a useful discussion of this last point, see Nina Tannenwald, Assessing the Effects and
Effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions, in DO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS MATTER 1, 25–26
(Evangelista & Tannenwald, eds. 2017).
60
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law theory was dominated by Austinian realism,62 and domestic legal theory was
dominated by the views of John Austin’s American heir, Oliver Wendell Holmes.63
By the positivists’ definition, law was the general command of a sovereign backed
by threat of sanction for disobedience.64 The “sovereign” power could take many
forms, but it was identifiable by society’s habitual obeisance of its orders, by its
internal supremacy (for the sovereign itself could not be subject to law), and by its
external independence from the command of any other power.65 As Holmes saw it,
the relationship of law to the consequences for its disobedience was fundamental;
law was distinguishable from morality because individual compliance was
motivated by identifiable material incentives—incentives moral principles alone
did not provide.66 For realist scholars of international law, this understanding led to
a simple, negative conclusion about the prospect of legal constraint. That is, while
it might appear a puzzle to explain why states could often be observed complying
with international rules in the absence of any overarching international enforcement
authority, whatever compliant behavior might be observed was the result of other
motives—an expression of existing state interests, not some independent effect of
law itself.67

62

See generally, e.g., Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 39 (summarizing theoretical evolution);
Richard H. Steinberg, Wanted – Dead or Alive: Realism in International Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
STATE OF THE ART 146 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (same). Embracing the
Austinian definition of law as the sanction-backed command of a sovereign, realist scholars
understood “law” as little more than a prediction of habitual compliance. KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (2010) (“Laws establish relationships between variables . .
. [I]f the relation between a and b is invariant, the law is absolute. If the relation is highly constant,
though not invariant, the law would read like this: if a, then b with probability x. A law is based not
simply on a relation that has been found, but on one that has been found repeatedly.”).
63
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960
(1992).
64
See generally JOHN AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1863).
65
Id.
66
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want
to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).
67
While acknowledging that international law had “in most instances been scrupulously observed”
in the preceding 400 years, Morgenthau found international law “primitive” as compared to the
domestic law model––a model in which law is “imposed by the [state] that holds the monopoly of
organized force.” HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE 285 (1948). In contrast to that vertical model of law, in the decentralized international
system in the relatively rare instances when law is violated, the availability of sanctions depended
solely on the “vicissitudes of the distribution of power between the violator of the law and the victim
of the violation.” Id., at 298. Scharf, supra note 40, at 52 (summarizing intellectual history).
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While more than one generation of theoretical,68 and more recently
empirical,69 critiques has by now substantially revised this elementary realist view,
the literature remains focused on solving the same puzzle the realists put forward:
how to explain observed compliance with public law rules in the absence of formal
legal enforcement?70 Today, one thus finds both theorists and empiricists who
maintain that states only comply when it is in their interest,71 and those who argue
that state compliance is a result of various influence mechanisms that law
independently channels or calls into play.72
In constitutional law, the conventional case—which treats the presidency as
fundamentally unconcerned with constitutional limits on the authority to use
force—likewise has deep roots in nineteenth and twentieth century thought.73
While Schlesinger’s Imperial Presidency was hardly the first to conceive of the
notion that constitutional law did not much constrain presidential war power,74 it
crystallized the terms of the conventional case, which makes the passivity of the
legislative and judicial branches central to the reason why non-compliance is seen
and expected. As foreign affairs law specialists regularly explained, that state of
68

See generally OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLITICS (2006) (compiling readings on constructivism, institutionalism and others as
among critiques of realist theory).
69
For useful reviews of the field of empirical study in international law, see generally Hafner-Burton
et al., supra note 26; Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 26; Simmons, supra note 26.
70
See, e.g., Jana von Stein, The Engines of Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 62, at 478 (“If no higher
authority exists [to enforce international law,] why should we ever observe compliance?”);
SIMMONS, supra note 48, at 114 (identifying the ongoing puzzle of international law compliance
literature similarly: with “no ‘law enforcement’ corps to enforce the rules . . . . , what (if anything)
drives compliance . . . ?”); Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1796 (2009) (describing the puzzle of
“how public law regimes can effectively constrain the behavior of states in the absence of any
superstate enforcement authority”); Koh, supra note 28, at 2603–04; CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note
38, at 3–9.
71
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 7–8; Benjamin Valentino et al., Covenants
Without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War, 58 WORLD
POLITICS 339–77 (Apr. 2006).
72
See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 47; SIMMONS, supra note 48; GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 48.
73
The most influential constitutional law treatise scholar of the Civil War era, William Whiting,
embraced a limitless vision of executive power as commander-in-chief. See generally WILLIAM
WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (10th ed. 1864). This
vision was embraced and extended by Edward Corwin in the years after World War II. See EDWARD
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, at 227–42 (1958) (“[T]he facts of the
Civil War had shown conclusively that in meeting the domestic problems that a great war inevitably
throws up[,] an indefinite power must be attributed to the President to take emergency measures . .
. . [A] practice so deeply embedded in our governmental structure should be treated as decisive of
the constitutional issue.”). By World War II, Roosevelt’s former Attorney General had famously
explained (in contextualizing President Roosevelt’s support for the internment of Japanese
Americans): “The Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President. That was a question
of law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must decide. And meanwhile—probably a long
meanwhile—we must get on with the war.” F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962).
74
See SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 498–99.
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affairs created “a climate in which Presidents have regularly breached
constitutional principles,”75 facilitating the ascendancy of an executive branch
pulled “into a continuing pattern of evasion” of compliance with constitutional
constraint.76 Indeed, even as much more recent empirical work has begun to call
fundamental elements of the conventional case into question—suggesting Congress
and the courts may be more influential than long assumed77—the scholarship here,
as in international law, sooner or later adopts the conventional metric of assessing
legal constraint: whether or not the executive branch changes its behavior to
comply.78
Yet as these debates over the puzzle of compliance in the absence of
enforcement unspooled in political science departments and in the legal academy
through the twentieth century, Hart’s The Concept of Law, first published in 1961,
had elsewhere dismantled the Austinian definition of law point by point. Not all
laws were in the form of commands, Hart explained. Many laws rather conferred
and guided the conduct of governance (public power), or created and guided legal
relations (private power). These were laws whose violation did not result in any
“sanction” as such, but rather, for example, in the recognition that the exercise of
power had been without legal effect.79 While some laws necessarily resulted in
state-imposed sanctions for violation (like criminal statutes), those rules generally
applied equally to private individuals and to the public officials who enact the laws
as “sovereign” authority.80 Indeed, it made as little sense to identify the sovereign
as one “necessarily exempt from legal limitation,” as it did to identify the
sovereign’s laws as “habitually obeyed,” when laws presumptively remain in effect
from one legislature or governing regime to the next, well before the new regime
could demonstrate any reality of habitual obeisance.81 In all events, it was unclear
in Austin’s conception what should count as evidence of “obedience” when, as
would often be the case, “the person ordered would certainly have done the very
same thing without any order.”82
In Hart’s universe, the touchstone of law was thus not the external
application or prediction of sanction (for only some laws require or trigger it), but
75

FISHER, supra note 7, at xi.
KOH, supra note 8, at 122.
77
See supra notes 11–13.
78
See, e.g., Deeks, supra note 13, at 834–35 (joining critics of the view that the executive is
unconstrained by law by “offering examples of situations in which the executive has declined to
pursue its preferred course of action because it viewed that course as legally unavailable”); Pildes,
supra note 39, at 1410.
79
HART, supra note 25, at 33–38, 79.
80
Id. at 79.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 51 (“[I]t is not easy to state, even in the case of a single order given face to face by one man
to another, precisely what connection there must be between the giving of the order and the
performance of the specified act in order that the latter should constitute obedience.”); see also id.
at 114 (“[The ordinary citizen] may obey [law] for a variety of different reasons and among them
may often, though not always, be the knowledge that it will be best for him to do so.”).
76
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officials’ internal sense of obligation—the sense that “the general demand for
conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon those who
deviate or threaten to deviate is great.”83 Among the advantages of this view was
that it better described the range of rules necessary and apparent in a functioning
legal system. Primary rules of course remained, by which “human beings are
required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not.”84 Many
such rules simply captured pre-existing (i.e. pre-codification) moral expectations
or social habits. But because all such rules by their nature carry certain defects—
most evidently, uncertainty in meaning and “the fact of violation”—mature legal
systems also had secondary rules: power-conferring rules by which primary rules
could be authoritatively identified, applied, and changed.85 Legal systems
addressed the problem of uncertainty in rules by providing structures and processes
for settling what counts as law, “either by reference to an authoritative text or to an
official whose declarations on this point are authoritative.” And they solved the
“fact of violation” (a function of the “inefficiency of diffused social pressure”) by
providing similarly authoritative mechanisms for defining what counts as a
transgression of law.86 In this view, just two conditions were thus “necessary and
sufficient” to constitute a mature legal system. First, public officials must have
internalized acceptance of primary rules—rules they may obey “from any motive
whatever,” whether or not they fear sanctions. Second, public officials must equally
accept a framework of secondary rules and structures within which law is made and
applied—rules officials must regard as “common standards of official behavior and
appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.”87
If Hart’s view is right, the implications for empirical studies in this realm
are substantial. At a minimum, Hart’s views imply that empiricists might find much
more significant evidence of legal constraint not by counting behavioral outcomes,
compliant or not, but by assessing whether individual officials have a “sense of
obligation” to primary rules or secondary structures.88 But before more fully
exploring Hart’s implications for empirical design—a topic to which this Article
returns in detail below—it is worth pausing to understand why his more
contemporary understanding of legal systems has, to date, been largely absent from
the literature of legal constraint on the use of force.89 Part of the explanation is no
83

HART, supra note 25, at 86; see also J. M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The
Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 110 (1993) (“Since H.L.A.
Hart, jurisprudence has been grounded on the so-called ‘internal point of view’—the perspective of
a participant in the legal system who regards its laws as norms for her behavior.”).
84
HART, supra note 25, at 81.
85
Id. at 81, 92–94 (describing the need for rules of recognition, change, and adjudication that
determine what the primary legal rules are and when they have been violated).
86
Id. at 92–93, 96.
87
Id. at 116–17.
88
See infra Part III.
89
While it is certainly true that the distinction between Hartian and Holmesian understandings of
law have in recent years found their way into theoretical work on the nature of legal constraint, see,
e.g., Pildes, supra note 39, at 1410 (“Ever since H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, theorists have
recognized that the existence of a legal system ultimately depends upon a socially shared rule of
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doubt simply interdisciplinary distance: the study of state behavior in this realm in
both political science and law has famously suffered from basic definitional
disconnects.90 Further, compliance has been a particularly attractive metric for
contemporary empiricists, who are sensibly drawn to the methodological
possibilities of large and available datasets. Most significant for present purposes,
even among scholars who broadly view Hart and his jurisprudential heirs as having
left Austin “jurisprudentially dead” when it came to the operation of ordinary
municipal law,91 there are significant doubts as to Hart’s descriptive relevance to
constitutional and international law in particular.92 The remainder of this Part thus
takes on these concerns, taking each field in turn. For while these concerns are
important, they do not overcome the ways in which Hart is deeply relevant to the
study of modern legal constraints on state uses of force. Most important, it is
entirely consistent with Hartian jurisprudence to imagine that settlement of legal
meaning may be had not only by operation of the judgment of a singular court of
compulsory jurisdiction, but also through a series of distributed mechanisms that
can, and regularly do, provide adequate settlement in the individual case.
A. Constitutional Law
Among constitutional scholars, there remains only a small but vocal number
who still embrace the Holmesian insistence that law matters only as a function of
its formal sanction.93 The greater number, while embracing Hart in general, harbor
recognition, at least among public officials . . . .”); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 70, at, 1799–
1800 (“Few contemporary jurisprudes would join Hobbes and Austin in casting sanction-based
commands or sovereignty in the central roles these concepts play in the conventional wisdom about
the exceptionalism of international law . . . .”), this work does not much contemplate the implications
of Hart’s framework for empirical design. Among the few scholars who have suggested Hart might
have something useful to say about empirical design in this realm, they find in Hart’s utility
generally limited to his recognition of the importance of norm internalization without more. See,
e.g., Bradley & Morrison, Presidential Power, supra note 54, at 1122–23; Manik V. Suri,
Reorienting the Principal-Agent Frame: Adopting the “Hartian” Assumption in Understanding and
Shaping Legal Constraints on the Executive, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 448 (2013). This
generalized understanding avoids distinguishing between internalization of primary and secondary
rules, and equally makes it possible to elide which official actors might be the most significant
indication of the internalization of either kind of rule—focusing invariably on assessments of
executive branch lawyers, rather than executive branch actors responsible for policy decisions. See
Pildes, supra note 39, at 1400 (noting how accounts of legal advisors “run the risk of being selfserving or suffering various forms of self-attribution bias”). Above all, they continue to
conceptualize legal constraint as requiring that law has at least the potential to be a singular, but-for
cause of decision-making, a measure that sociologists would doubt exists, see supra, text
accompanying note 61, and Hart does not require, see supra, text accompanying note 88.
90
See, e.g., INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 62, at 11 (describing an array of interdisciplinary tensions).
91
Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 70, at 1800.
92
HART, supra note 25, at 213–37.
93
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 7–11 (embracing an instrumental account of law’s
operation); Pildes, supra note 39, at 1392–93 (“[T]he premise [of Posner and Vermeule’s work] . .
. is that public officials obey the law not for normative reasons but only when the benefits of legal
compliance in specific contexts outweigh the costs.”).
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concerns about the implications of Hart’s model for constitutional law in
particular.94 The existence of the Constitution itself can hardly count as a rule of
recognition (or as containing a rule of recognition), for the text standing alone
settles almost nothing at all.95 Given the chronic debate in constitutional law over
interpretive methods (and equally vigorous debates about which, if any, branch is
the authoritative institutional interpreter), it is indeed arguably difficult to pinpoint
a constitutional law rule of recognition—a settled understanding of how to identify
what the law is.96 Especially for those who embrace the view that more than one
branch of government has (at least some) power to interpret the Constitution, or
even the arguably lesser power to have its practice inform constitutional meaning,
it seems difficult to conclude that there could ever be an authoritative settlement of
constitutional meaning.97
Indeed, even for those less concerned by the nature of the independent
interpretive authority retained by the political branches, there is little doubt that our
judicial system famously struggles, and regularly fails, to adjudicate on the merits
violations of even some of our most important primary rules.98 The Supreme
Court—the only court jurisdictionally capable of imposing formal uniformity on
countless constitutional decisions reached in lower federal and state courts—
resolves only a tiny fraction of constitutional disputes that arise in the United States
every year. Many more constitutional questions arise, and must be resolved, every
day in the work of legislatures and executives at the federal and state levels as they
draft, apply, and enforce legal rules under circumstances no court will ever review.
Disagreements on the meaning and effect of the Constitution arise within
government (between the President and Congress, or a state governor and
legislature), and it is far from certain as a matter of law who prevails in all such
disputes.99 In the end, not even Supreme Court settlement guarantees that legal
questions are well and forever settled, as the Court itself has had occasion to change
its mind about legal meaning on matters both small and large over the years.100 The
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list of reasons for the non-settlement of questions surrounding the violation of more
than one aspect of constitutional law goes on quite a bit longer.
For critical constitutional scholars, the prospect thus looms large that in
Hartian terms, the United States lacks a mature constitutional legal system: an
agreed upon set of secondary rules and processes by which primary constitutional
rules may be authoritatively identified and applied.101 Yet one could well imagine
(and examine empirically) a particular setting in which the function of legal
recognition is served by a customary rule, or by a more or less formal cluster of
methodologies defining the terms by which debates over meaning are held. One
could equally imagine (and examine empirically) a form of settlement in a
particular field through distributed lower courts and arbiters, executive offices and
agencies, and even professional norms and cultural customs. Far from imaginary,
the United States has long relied on bureaucratic structures other than courts to
settle manifold domestic law questions in more and less formal ways.102
Indeed, one of the most intriguing implicit findings in recent studies of legal
constraints surrounding the use of force has challenged the expectation that a
singular court of compulsory jurisdiction is the only effective way to achieve
functionally effective settlement in the meaning and application of law. Trevor
Morrison, for example, describes the longstanding practice among executive
branch officials of treating Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions as binding
within the executive branch,103 and further characterizes OLC’s practice of treating
prior OLC opinions as binding on the OLC itself.104 Focusing separately on the role
of international law in constraining official use-of-force behavior, Laura Dickinson
interviewed military lawyers in the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps with
active-duty service, and found organizational and professional cultural mechanisms
through which lawyers embedded with combat troops functioned to operationalize
and settle basic law of war rules—up to and including military-agency processes of
adjudication and discipline.105
It is certainly fair to wonder in evaluating the import of such examples how
authoritative such mechanisms really are and how settled the meaning assigned to
rules by these branch or agency-specific structures really could be. But for Hart, the
most useful assessment of a legal system’s maturity is relative: the assessment of
any legal system’s maturity could only be judged with reference to a conventional
domestic law counterpart. In constitutional terms, one might imagine it useful to
101
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compare, for example, the availability of authoritative settlement of the legality of
executive branch use-of-force actions under the Constitution’s Article II, with the
availability of authoritative settlement of the legality of, for example, use-of-force
actions by private security companies under federal statutory law, or the
comparative frequency of interpretive settlement on analogous topics of public and
private law. Either way, Hartian jurisprudence allows for the prospect that
secondary rules and structures may exist whether or not in the form of traditional
courts.
B. International Law
Hart himself was notably equivocal about the relevance of his model to
international law. On one hand, Hart was little persuaded that the standard critique
of international law—i.e., its lack of effective sanctions for violation—sufficed to
render international law (as realist international relations theorists had it) not
“law.”106 Even granting, for example, that the U.N. Security Council could not
effectively impose sanctions against veto-bearing members for violations of
Chapter VII’s prohibition of aggressive war, the Charter’s primary rule against the
use of force was nonetheless “thought and spoken of as obligatory,” and carried
significant pressure for conformity.107 Indeed, in Hart’s view, international law
prohibitions on violence did not need sanctions to be effective in the same way
primary rules against violence domestically required, for the risks and costs of war
carried ample “natural deterrents” not otherwise present domestically.108
International law was certainly “law.”
Hart’s hesitation was rather over whether it could be persuasively
demonstrated that international law was part of a mature legal system—that it had
secondary rules and processes of change and adjudication (like those that could be
applied by institutions like legislatures and courts), and a secondary rule of
recognition specifying how its sources and rules were identified.109 Treaties could
not really be analogized to legislation, Hart suggested, since international law,
unlike domestic law, would still recognize the validity of agreements extorted by
violence.110 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), while boasting a high rate of
compliance with its decisions overall, was for most states not really a court of
compulsory jurisdiction; a state is only subject to its judgments so long as the state
consents.111 And there was still no unifying rule of recognition, no settled-upon way
to identify what counted as “law” or not. What remained was to imagine that
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international law was “at present in a state of transition towards” developing rules
and structures that would make it more like a mature legal system over time.112
Nearly sixty years since The Concept of Law appeared, it is perhaps
unsurprising to find that many of the particular examples Hart highlighted in 1961,
to illustrate the ways in which international law lacks the secondary rules and
structures required of a functioning legal system, are today outdated. While Hart
wrote, for instance, of the absence of an international law “rule of recognition” by
which uncertainty about the existence of a primary rule might be settled, as it
concerned treaties, that absence was surely filled in some substantial measure by
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which opened for signature in 1969
and entered into force in 1980.113 Today, the great majority of states has ratified or
at least signed the Convention, which, inter alia, defines the kind of agreements that
count as treaties and how those agreements may be authenticated.114 The same
multilateral Vienna Convention makes clear (contra Hart) that agreements entered
into by coercion (by the threat or use of force) today are void and without any legal
effect.115 And for the many treaties entered into voluntarily and ratified
universally—characteristics that describe both the UN Charter (containing the rule
prohibiting wars of aggression) and the four primary Geneva Conventions
(regulating the use of force in war)—not even Hart would likely resist the analogy
to legal change by a secondary process (for better or worse) akin to legislation.116
Such significant changes aside, Hart was, if anything, more concerned in
this context about the absence of an international court of compulsory
jurisdiction117—an institution he takes to be an essential mechanism to make
“authoritative determinations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a
primary rule has been broken.”118 Indeed, it is still true that the singular court Hart
discussed, the ICJ, may assert jurisdiction only over state parties, and only to the
112
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extent they consent to the exercise of its authority. 119 Yet here, too, the situation
today is hardly the same as it was in 1961. Most obvious, the ICJ is far from the
only international court in operation: various international and regional courts of
specialized subject matter or geographical jurisdiction are empowered by
multilateral treaty to issue authoritative decisions on particular questions of
violation.120 At a minimum, then, the availability of authoritative, formal
international adjudication of interpretive disputes (or not) must be assessed at the
retail level, that is, with reference to particular disputes involving particular
questions of substantive law.
But even where compliance scholars might acknowledge the availability of
such settlement in some realms of international law, the absence of an international
court of compulsory jurisdiction in other subject matter fields continues to provide
fodder for the animating puzzle in compliance literature: how to explain state
compliance in the absence of unitary, international authorities, including a
compulsory court.121 Here, it becomes necessary to move beyond Hart’s particular
examples and show how modern practice helps demonstrate the falsity of the
expectation that a singular court of compulsory jurisdiction is the only effective
way to achieve settlement in the identification and application of law. Hart certainly
posited that rules of recognition would commonly be found in an authoritative text,
or the opinions of a singular institution with the power to interpret it. He likewise
recognized that “authoritative determinations of the question whether, on a
particular occasion, a primary rule has been broken” would commonly be provided
by a conventional court.122 But neither Hart himself nor his concept of law requires
that the systemic function of recognition and settlement be served only by such
structures.
As legal scholars have long pointed out, formal domestic legal structures
regularly struggle and fail to adjudicate, on the merits, violations of even some of
their most important primary rules, most especially in the realm of public law.123 In
this respect, it should seem unremarkable to imagine that alternative structures—
whether or not courts, whether or not “of compulsory jurisdiction,” and indeed
whether or not international—would develop to provide settlement of legal
meaning to accomplish a functionally equivalent effect, that is, to render primary
rules at least effectively constraining on state governments bound by them. Indeed,
119
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both through domestic legal systems, and through formal and informal structures
internationally, it has become evident how international legal meaning even in
fields without a singular court of compulsory jurisdiction might achieve at least as
much settlement as we might expect to observe in any ordinary context of municipal
law. Instances of what one might call distributed settlement abound in both
domestic and international legal systems.
In the domestic courts, consider the U.S. courts’ engagement with the
Geneva Conventions and their application to U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11, 2001.124 A dispute famously arose
about the application of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions when Salim Hamdan,
detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, faced a U.S. military commission
prosecution for offenses against the law of war, allegedly committed as the driver
for Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The Geneva Conventions by their terms
apply to two situations: “armed conflicts” identified in Article 2 that “arise between
two or more of the [state] Parties,” (commonly called international armed conflicts,
or “IACs”), and “armed conflicts” identified in Article 3 that are “not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the [state] Parties” (often
called non-international armed conflicts or “NIACs”).125 Article 3, common to all
four Geneva Conventions, sets forth a set of important rules to be followed in
“armed conflicts not of an international character,” including prohibitions against
“cruel treatment and torture,” and the requirement that all criminal sentences be
“pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”126
Hamdan challenged the legality of the commissions in federal court for,
among other things, violating the Article 3 requirement that sentences be
pronounced by “regularly constituted courts.” The Bush Administration responded
to this claim with its view that the Geneva Conventions did not by law apply to
U.S. military operations against Al Qaeda; the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda was
governed neither by Article 2 (it was not a conflict between states, as Al Qaeda was
not a state), nor by Article 3 (for because U.S. military operations against Al Qaeda
were transnational in scope, the conflict could not be considered a conflict “not of
an international character”).127
The question of the effect of Article 3 in Hamdan’s case was litigated
through the U.S. domestic legal system and resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Relying on the text of the treaties, interpretive commentaries by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and prior decisions of the ICJ and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (a court created by U.N.
124
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Security Council Resolution in 1993), the U.S. Court held that the Article 3 phrase
“conflict not of an international character” did indeed apply to the conflict in which
Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan. The Court explained that a conflict “not of
an international character” was “distinguishable from the conflict described in
Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations.” So
long as the non-state party was involved in a conflict “in the territory of” a state
party to the Conventions, Article 3 must be understood to apply.128
Following the Court’s ruling, the U.S. government suspended the operation
of military commission trials, and the commission rules were revised by Congress
with a set of rules affording defendants a greater array of “judicial guarantees” of
procedural fairness. Indeed, within a week of the Hamdan decision, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense issued an order directing the review of “all relevant directives,
regulations, policies, practices and procedures . . . to ensure they comply with the
standards of Common Article 3.” Within eight weeks, the President announced
publicly that all detainees held by the United States (detainees the government had
previously viewed as not legally entitled to Geneva protection) would receive the
protections Common Article 3 required.129
How are we to evaluate this example as evidence that it may be possible for
a domestic, not international, court to achieve an authoritative settlement of the
import of international law? If one were hoping for an internationally authoritative
judgment issued by a supranational sovereign, Hamdan is not it. Hamdan of course
purports to bind only the government of the United States (and even there, only by
“consent,” for the Supreme Court itself lacks any army to enforce its judgments
against the President). It has not settled the meaning and application of Article 3
for all states, in all settings, for all time.
Yet it is not immediately apparent why supranational adjudication should
be required for meaningful settlement in such a setting. As Hart recognized,
adjudicative judgments would be by their nature imperfect, for “judgments may not
be couched in general terms and their use as authoritative guides to the rules
depends on a somewhat shaky inference from particular decisions.”130 No
adjudicative judgment from any court with jurisdiction of any scope can
conclusively or universally settle all questions of legal meaning. Hamdan presented
a question about the application of international law in a context that involved no
disagreement—no need for coordination or authoritative settlement—between
states. Rules of adjudication are required only insofar as needed to remedy
“inefficiencies” in the way in which the social pressure of law is implemented;
adjudication is only necessary for the purpose of establishing whether, “on a
particular occasion, a primary rule has been broken.”131 What would seem to matter
far more in Hart’s terms is that here, there can be little question that from an internal
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perspective—that is, from the perspective of the U.S. President, the Secretary of
Defense, and other U.S. government agencies and officials to whom the Hamdan
decision was directed—the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling was an amply authoritative
settlement of an interpretive dispute about the import of international law in a
particular case of alleged violation. If the object of a primary international law rule
is to compel (or restrict) action by a state official decision maker or set of decision
makers, then it may be that all the adjudicative settlement required is that which
suffices to persuade that decision maker that the law is authoritatively settled for
his state.
Perhaps a greater problem for the significance of the Hamdan example is
the suspicion that, while it has the effect of constraining the behavior of the
particular state over which it has binding jurisdiction, Hamdan (or comparable
judgments by other courts of limited jurisdiction) provides no international
settlement of meaning—that while the law is settled enough to compel compliance
by the state in which the matter arose, domestic courts of other states might well
come to different conclusions about the meaning and application of Article 3, or
lack mature systems of adjudication entirely. And when a dispute arises
surrounding the law of armed conflict that does involve a disagreement among
states, Hamdan will serve no more purpose than to demonstrate a single state’s view
of the meaning and effect of Article 3.
Yet contemporary practice also offers examples suggesting that even courts
of limited jurisdiction may, through cumulative judgments over time, have the same
effect of achieving settlement in international meaning. Take, for example, the
remarkable inter-jurisdictional penetration of a decision by the special criminal
tribunal created for the former Yugoslavia (the ICTY) on the subject of what counts
as a “non-international armed conflict” (NIAC) triggering the application of the
Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 3. The ICTY’s Tadić test defining what
counts as a NIAC (a war involving at least one non-state actor) has been
subsequently embraced by, among others, the International Criminal Court, the
European Court of Justice, and the U.S. federal courts.132 Tadić is likewise
recognized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as the
controlling test, and Tadić is cited by multiple states in official defense department
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law of war manuals (including the United States’) as the relevant principle of
law.133
Even acknowledging the absence, at least in the most general terms, of a
singular, authoritative global executive or judicial decision maker for all law-ofwar purposes, the inter-jurisdictional acceptance of Tadić demonstrates how a
distributed network of legal decision makers, each authoritative in its own
jurisdiction, may have the same effect. The same phenomenon is apparent in U.S.
domestic law, where countless constitutional decisions are reached in lower federal
and state courts, and by legislatures and executive branch actors at the federal and
state levels every day; such decision makers must draft, apply, and enforce
constitutional and international law rules as a matter of course under circumstances
no singular court will ever review.134 It may not be an ideal legal system in some
abstract sense. Neither can it be said to produce uniform settlement of all legal
disputes. But it is not broadly possible to distinguish the NIAC standard, or indeed
many parts of international law, from our domestic legal system in this respect.
Such phenomena may themselves be assessable only in retail fashion
(depending on the particular question of international law). And for each such
instance, scholars can point to a contrary example supporting the notion of
irremediable uncertainty in the meaning and application of various aspects of
international law, in the absence of a singular global court or police force. Jack
Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, for instance, point to NATO’s 1999 air bombing
campaign in Kosovo (undertaken without U.N. Security Council authorization),
noting that states and scholars have debated ever since whether there is now a
developing customary international law exception for humanitarian intervention to
the otherwise-applicable requirement of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter that a state
use force against another state only with such authorization (or in apparent selfdefense).135 The Kosovo example is perhaps not as useful as might appear for
purposes of illustrating the uncertainty of meaning surrounding a treaty text, for
there was vast agreement that the intervention, when undertaken, was “illegal” (a
point so apparently uncontestable that even Goldsmith and Levinson describe the
campaign as “in violation of” Article 2 without need of elaboration).136 But a better
133
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example of unsettled law in this realm is not hard to find: the legality of the United
States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, which the United States controversially maintained
was authorized by existing U.N. Security Council Resolution, an interpretation
much of the rest of the world rejected in more or less express terms. One might
equally cite the increasingly urgent question whether a particular cyberattack might
count as a “use of force” within the meaning of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, or
whether the existence of a “continuing imminent threat” might justify invocation
of the “inherent right of self-defense” under Article 51. Indeed, interpretive disputes
about particular alleged violations in this realm—what in U.S. law are often called
“open questions”—abound.
Hart’s framework is especially important in evaluating the significance of
such examples. For Hart’s approach to such questions was necessarily relative—
that is, if one’s interest in “international law” is to understand the relative maturity
or effectiveness of a legal system, such maturity could only be judged with
reference to a developed domestic counterpart. Here, it is far from apparent that the
absence of authoritative settlement of actions implicating Article 2(4) is any more
common in the international setting than it is in domestic law. The failure of the
U.S. legal system to provide authoritative adjudicative settlement (or its functional
equivalent) of disputes surrounding the U.S. statutory Authorization for Use of
Military Force, for example, or the U.S. Constitution’s Declare War or
Commander-in-Chief Clauses is well known. Happily, the comparative frequency
of interpretive settlement (of one form or another) on analogous topics of domestic
and international public law begins to sound like just the kind of question one might
be able to shed more light on—by examining the matter empirically.
III. An Empirical Path Forward
Where it is possible and necessary to distinguish between primary rules and
secondary systems,137 the results of an empirical study attempting to shed light on
the vitality of a primary obligation or a secondary system by looking at compliance
alone are either indeterminate or circular. To the extent the empiricist who asks
“does law constrain?” is interested in understanding whether an official feels
constrained to behave a particular way, findings of compliance (without more)
produce circular results about the role of law as such in shaping that feeling. Does
the official feel obliged to behave in a certain way because of law, or does the
137
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existence (or emergence) of a law reflect some other, extra-legal sense of
obligation? To the extent the empiricist who asks “does law constrain?” is
interested in the impact (or absence) of secondary rules and structures—the
effectiveness of mechanisms for dealing with uncertainty in meaning or law’s
putative violation—compliance is indeterminate. If an executive has complied, is
this an indication of the extent to which officials share a social acceptance of the
sense of a primary obligation, or of the existence of more robust secondary rules of
recognition or adjudication than otherwise understood, or one or more of both?
Indeed, even if compliance studies are refined to distinguish more carefully
between primary rules and secondary processes, Hart’s jurisprudence points to a
more profound problem for the hope that behavioral outcomes alone can tell us
something meaningful about the role of legal beliefs or processes in influencing
decisions. Scholars across disciplines have long struggled with the problem of
distinguishing law and (for example) politics at the level of theory, a problem all
the more difficult at the level of human behavior, perhaps especially so in this
realm.138 Hartian jurisprudence helps navigate that dilemma. Hart recognized that
it is neither at times possible to establish a singular causal basis for human behavior,
nor is it a necessary measure of the maturity of a legal system to show such a
cause.139 Where legal uncertainty and periodic law violation are standard features
of any system, what distinguishes a mature legal system is not compliance because
of law, but rather the existence of a sense of obligation felt for whatever reason by
public officials to both primary rules and secondary processes within which law is
made and applied—processes officials must regard as “common standards of
official behavior and appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as
lapses.”140
Hart’s model in this regard should seem especially apt in the context of
executive branch decision-making. As more journalistic or qualitative accounts of
executive decision-making have suggested, decisions involving the use of force
regularly turn on multiple, often causally intertwined considerations negotiated
among a group of (themselves individually conflicted) decision makers.141 The
prospect of isolating any one causal factor in this context seems especially ill-fated.
More, just as we can readily name common circumstances in which well-developed
rule-of-law societies forgive even manifest law violation—think of the driver who
exceeds the speed limit to get an ill passenger to a hospital—so, too, we might
imagine extraordinary circumstances that lead executive officials to view law
violation as the lesser breach of social obligation.142 Just as letting the speeding
138
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driver off with a warning does not lead us to question the possibility that traffic
laws either describe or affect some form of constraint, certain instances of noncompliant behavior may be less evidence of inoperative constraint, as of a rational
balancing of anticipated consequences, including the knowing violation of law.
How, then, might Hart propose we measure the effect of law on decisions
regarding the use of force? In the first instance, he would surely insist the empiricist
distinguish in her inquiry between the perception of a particular sense of obligation,
and the assessment of any, or any effective, secondary systems that might cure legal
indeterminacy or settle questions of law violation. The shape of the inquiry flows
from there. To test the vitality of a putative legal rule prohibiting, say, the President
from introducing ground combat troops into major hostilities without congressional
authorization, an empiricist would first assess individual officials’ sense of the
existence of an obligation not to introduce ground troops without Congress’
permission. Here, the empiricist’s question is not, importantly, whether an
individual official is aware of the legally binding effect of, say, the Declare War
Clause of Article I of the Constitution, but rather whether the individual feels a
sense that they ought for whatever reason not to engage in (or recommend) the
conduct our asserted primary rule proscribes. Likewise, to test for the likely
effectiveness of any primary rule prohibiting, for instance, the deliberate targeting
of civilians, Hart would presumably want to assess the individual officials’ sense
of an obligation not to target civilians. Again here, the empiricist’s question is not
whether an individual official is aware of the legally binding effect of, say, Article
51 of Additional Protocol I,143 but rather whether the individual feels a sense of
obligation for whatever reason not to engage in the conduct Article 51 proscribes.
To test for the maturity of a legal system surrounding either rule, the
empiricist would begin by examining whether public officials recognize a
framework of secondary rules within which law about the scope of executive power
is interpreted and applied—whether officials recognize “common standards of
official behavior” for the management of law, deviation from which is recognized
as a lapse.144 In contemplating a course of action, do officials accept and use a
common method for identifying a legal rule? Do officials seek to engage or rely on
elements of such a structure? Do they recognize failure to adhere to the legal
process as a breach? Here, the empiricist’s question is not, importantly, about
official recognition of particular secondary processes the Constitution intended, or
processes that seem compelled as a matter of some independent interpretive
judgment about the meaning of the operative law, but rather what official decision
makers identify and understand those processes in this context to be.
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It may be helpful to make the foregoing more concrete by considering the
effect of such a shift in methodology on a commonly discussed example—one that
goes to the core of the President’s power to use force.145 Consider President
Obama’s initial military intervention in Libya in 2011, undertaken without prior
congressional authorization.146 How would one evaluate this example as evidence
or not of law’s role in decision-making? A conventional answer readily categorizes
this instance as evidence that “legal checks on unilateral uses of military force are
weak at best,”147 for prior congressional authorization (unmodified) is the
presumptive constitutional rule, and the President’s behavior is in this respect
manifestly non-compliant. (The conventional answer, likewise, perfectly blurs
whether the “weakness” of “legal checks” is in the officials’ lack of internalized
acceptance of the substantive rule requiring congressional authorization, or in some
inadequacy associated with the process for interpreting and applying it, or both.)
A Hartian empiricist attempting to understand what a Libya-type case tells
us about the vitality of constraints in the legal system would resist resting any
conclusion on the finding of non-compliance alone. For what if the decision maker
understood, even if erroneously, the use of force in that instance to be in accord
with legal obligations? What if the decision maker in that instance felt an obligation
to go to Congress, and understood the law to require as much, but felt an even
stronger obligation (for moral or other reasons) to act in contravention of his legal
obligation in this particular case? One might find the decision to bomb Libya under
such circumstances problematic for a variety of reasons, but it would be inaccurate
to conclude that the decision maker’s action reflected the weakness of law’s
“constraint” per se. Instead, a Hartian empiricist would explore the extent to which
executive branch decision makers perceived an obligation to go to Congress under
the circumstances Libya presented.148 An empiricist would then separately examine
the extent to which executive branch decision makers recognized a shared process
for resolving whether their sense of an obligation aligned with what the law
required or not.
In the Libya example, the contemporaneous opinion prepared by OLC on
the constitutionality of the intervention, which may be taken as at best an imperfect
indicator of executive branch lawyers’ sense of the primary constitutional
obligation, suggests the existence of a sense of obligation, but to a different
One might equally usefully apply this analysis to the Bush Administration’s decision to use force
in Iraq in 2003, notwithstanding deep concerns about the existence of UN Security Council
Authorization under the UN Charter’s Article II.
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substantive primary rule than prior congressional authorization in all cases. As OLC
had it:
[T]he President’s legal authority to direct military force in Libya turns on two
questions: first, whether United States operations in Libya would serve sufficiently
important national interests to permit the President’s action as Commander in Chief
and Chief Executive and pursuant to his authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations;
and second, whether the military operations that the President anticipated ordering
would be sufficiently extensive in ‘nature, scope, and duration’ to constitute a ‘war’
requiring prior specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War
Clause.149
From the perspective of the operative decision makers, the course embarked upon
in Libya was quite plausibly consistent with OLC’s opinion. In this regard, Libya
may be better described not so much as an example of the failure of legal constraint
as a whole, but rather as evidence that the sense of primary obligation officials
recognize is not as restrictive an obligation as some conventional scholars assume.
Indeed, this assessment puts Libya in substantially the same category as
conventional analysis puts the same President’s later decision—classically puzzling
to Austinians—to refrain from using force in Syria in 2013 (following its use of
chemical weapons) absent congressional authorization.150
By the same token, one might conclude that the Libya case should be coded
as an example supporting the existence of systemic maturity of secondary
interpretive structures, for the President’s decision to seek the written guidance of
the OLC might appear to evince the acceptance by public officials of a framework
of secondary rules and structures within which the legal rule is recognized and/or
authoritatively settled (a structure involving the OLC and its opinions’ typically
precedential effect). It is certainly true that qualitative accounts—commonly
offered by executive branch lawyers themselves—describe OLC as the institutional
actor responsible for providing interpretive settlement of the interpretation and
application of constitutional law.151 Whether official decision makers other than
lawyers understand OLC as providing authoritative settlement of constitutional
questions in this context is a hypothesis well worth testing. Indeed, President
Obama’s reported decision several months after the initial attack on Libya to
override or circumvent a subsequent OLC opinion might be more likely coded as
an example tending to support the opposite conclusion, at least for statutory
interpretation. This action suggests less than invariable acceptance of OLC views
149
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as part of a framework through which law is authoritatively interpreted, or legal
meaning settled.152 One might thus usefully ask not only whether officials share the
perception of OLC’s role, but also whether OLC is an actor from which they
themselves regularly seek guidance, and, perhaps above all, whether officials who
seek OLC (or other legal) guidance do so under circumstances in which OLC’s
answer is not certain in advance.
A more comprehensive study of the perception of legal obligations among
executive branch officials might well produce different results on the vitality of
constitutional constraint than would a study on the comparative effectiveness of
one or another mechanism for settlement. A sense of (some) obligation might be
well engrained, but a secondary process of settlement less so. Or vice versa. Either
result produces useful information about the independent maturity of both aspects
of the legal system. But the Libya decisions just canvassed must be recognized as
only singular examples in isolation. A survey capable of taking into account a
broader set of examples, hypothetical or otherwise, would tell us more.
While it may seem daunting to imagine operationalizing such a study that
explores decision-making beyond one or two specific case examples, it may be
worth a final few words here to sketch a practical design. Consider, for example, a
survey of a bipartisan population of senior national security policy advisers with
service in one or more U.S. presidential administrations within a historically
confined period. The survey might test confined hypotheses related to primary
obligations to seek congressional and/or U.N. Security Council authorization to use
force, through, for example, closed form questions involving a series of
hypothetical situations, changing one element in the hypothetical in each successive
question to illuminate the particular factors respondents believe relevant to their
sense of obligation. A separate set of questions could explore the availability of
commonly accepted secondary processes inside the executive branch for resolving
these rules’ application, examining when, why, how and from which institutional
office or structure they typically sought legal advice or guidance in the course of
their decision-making regarding the use of force. Such process questions avoid
assuming the role of one legal office or another; they equally permit examining the
extent to which officials pursued and/or acted on legal guidance even when they
assessed the answer to their question might be uncertain.
Survey subjects could be recruited from among former federal employees
likely to have been involved to some extent in executive branch decision-making
regarding the potential or actual use of U.S. military force abroad (where
“involvement” includes conducting research; preparing memos, talking points, or
other written materials; participating in meetings, making recommendations, or
taking decisions regarding the use of military force). U.S. government manuals
make publicly available, for instance, listings of the individuals who served on the
152
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U.S. National Security Council (NSC) Principals and Deputies Committees,
defined, by statute and presidential directive, as the “principal forum for
consideration of national security policy issues requiring presidential
determination.”153 Subjects could likewise be recruited from a collection of subDeputy-level former officials who served during this period in senior NSC staff or
NSC-relevant agency positions and are likely (based on statutory and/or
administrative rules establishing their position) to have participated in use-of-force
decision-making.154 And to help compensate for the likelihood that certain officials
may have great practical influence on use-of-force decision-making but carry
formal titles that do not necessarily reflect that influence (or whose role is otherwise
not publicly known), appropriate subjects could further be identified through
referrals and credible popular sources. At the same time, the survey population
could exclude those whose functions give them sets of political or professional
interests that may skew study results—such as those currently serving in the U.S.
government, and individuals whose primary title and/or official function was to
serve as legal counsel.
To be clear, while a variety of methods might help ensure the survey pool
features a reasonably representative sample of the target population—across
political party, for example—it cannot be expected to produce much in the way of
statistically significant results. The total pool of potential recruits is likely to
number no more than 200 or so individuals, and while snowball sampling is likely
153
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to be essential to ensure a reasonable response rate, the elite nature of the population
suggests it would be surprising to yield a total response set of a quarter of this size.
At the same time, a qualitative inquiry into the role law plays in decision-making
about the use of force might produce a wealth of insights worth examining. In the
centuries-long history of consideration about whether and why state policy makers
might consult the law before going to war, it has been remarkably difficult to
unearth the results of one inquiry that embraces as its methodology asking subjects
directly. For now, the point here is not to answer the question of constraint. It is
rather to urge that meaningful empirical understanding of whether public law
constrains executive branch decision-making requires a far more granular
assessment of laws and legal systems, of individual beliefs and official processes,
than is possible to achieve by knowing what, in the end, presidents do.
Conclusion
With a view to identifying a more satisfying methodological approach to
evaluating legal constraint, this Article suggests that law compliance—evidence
that a particular actor chose to undertake or forbear from conduct that, but for a
legal requirement or prohibition, they would not otherwise have done—is an
insufficiently meaningful metric for assessing the influence of public law on official
decision-making surrounding the use of force. While Hart long ago refuted the
notion that law was simply a set of sanction-based commands, his insight seems to
have been lost in contemporary studies of law’s effect on decision makers regarding
the use of force. Understanding whether and how law influences decision-making
even at the outer limits of executive power requires looking less at decision-making
outcomes, and more at the way in which law informs the beliefs and shapes the
environment in which officials arrive at their decision.
The dramatic period of international activity involving the use of force in
the nearly two decades since the attacks of September 2001 has produced a raft of
new empirical studies, in law and political science, aiming to understand whether,
when, and why state officials are constrained by law governing the use of armed
force. Accounts of U.S. government behavior in particular have featured radically
different assessments of the same empirical record—from a government untethered
by legal constraint, to one radically inhibited by law. While there should be little
doubt by now that empirical inquiry can shed light on what guides state behavior,
crafting an empirical study that can disentangle these conflicting perspectives
requires a clearer conception of what legal constraint really means. Jurisprudential
developments of the past half-century have shed substantial light on this question,
offering insights into law’s meaning and function that apply with increasing utility
to aspects of both constitutional and international law. Applying these insights
suggests it is time to move beyond studies of law compliance, to studies that can
measure more directly when obligations arise, and how legal systems mature.

